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Although sharecropping was found until recently throughout the Mediterranean 
region, the contract is usually considered as having been inefficient or as 
a response to some form of market failure, and is rarely seen as an institution 
favourable to agrarian development. In Cataluna from the late 17th century, 
however, sharecropping played a major role in establishing a dynamic 
agriculture in one of Europe's earliest industrializing regions. Rising export 
demand for spirits and wines led landowners to enter into indefinite 
sharecropping contracts (rabassa morta), bringing into production previously 
uncultivated scrub land. What perhaps is surprising is that sharecropping 
remained in operation for so long, lasting until well into the 20th century. 
In this paper we first examine the reasons for the long run success of the 
institution until the late 19th century. From the turn of the 20th century the 
region's viticulture began to lose competitiveness, and in the last section we 
attempt to explain why the contract was less successful that it had been 
previously. Two major arguments appear relevant, namely the changing nature 
of viticulture as it became more capital intensive, and the breakdown in trust 
between landowner and cropper. 
SHARECROPPING AND VITICULTURE 
Problems of monitoring and moral hazard help explain why sharecropping 
contracts were frequent, especially in viticulture, in the Mediterranean region. 
Typical of many agricultural activities, was the difficulty landowners had 
in determining between the effects of variations in the climate and those of 
labor inputs, on the quantity and quality of the grapes produced (Bardhan 
1984:161;Galassi 1992:82). Until the present century, there were few econo-
mies of scale in wine production, which made it unprofitable for landowners 
1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the universities of Leicester (at the congress "Land, 
labor and tenure: the institutional arrangements of conflict and cooperation in comparative perspective"), 
Carlos III de Madrid and the Autonoma de Barcelona (VIII Simposio de Historia Economica, 1996). 
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to closely supervise labor. During the 18th and much of the 19th centuries, 
wage labor was only important in those regions producing quality grapes 
and wines, such as sherry in Jerez (southern Spain) or clarets in the Bordeaux 
region, where better prices offset the high monitoring costs of labor. The 
use of rental contracts would, of course, have overcome the landlord's 
monitoring problems, allowing tenants to enjoy, in the form of increased 
output, all the benefits from improved cultivation. Yet rental contracts were 
rarely found in viticulture anywhere in the Mediterranean. This was because 
tenants could have increased output, at least in the short term, through heavy 
pruning, but at the expense of shortening the plant's productive life. Even 
with long term contracts, the landlord ran the risk of receiving back a dying 
vineyard. Only indefinite contracts might give tenants along term economic 
interest in the vineyard. However, indefinite contracts, based on a fixed annual 
payment, were liable to produce distributional conflicts. Future wine prices 
were impossible to forecast, so monetary rents were impractical. Although 
this problem might be solved by using a fixed, annual payment in kind, 
landlords ran the risk that their relative share of the harvest would decline 
during periods of high wine prices (tenants maximizing output - but at the 
cost of shortening the vineyard's life), or losing their tenants during those 
of falling prices (tenants considering that the rent was higher than the marginal 
productivity of their labor). Long term, sharecropping contracts therefore 
helped to overcome both the problems of monitoring, and solved those of 
moral hazard by providing both parties a direct interest in the long term 
success of the vineyard. 
Recent literature has dwelt on the fact that the harvest in sharecropping 
contracts is frequently divided between the sharecropper and the landowner 
in an arbitrary 50:50 (Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami 1992: 1969 and 1977). 
For critics of sharecropping, the fact that tenants only received half the 
marginal product of their labor implied that incentives to better cultivation 
were likely to be seriously reduced. As we shall see, this only appears to 
have been a problem relatively late in the rabassa morta's history. We argue 
that for an institution to last over several centuries, such as was the case of 
the rabassa morta, there was need for considerable flexibility in the face 
of changing relative prices and technology. In the rest of this paper we shall 
examine this flexibility, concentrating on two periods of major significance, 
namely the initial planting of the vineyards in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, and their replanting at the turn of the 20th century. 
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THE EXPANSION OF CATALAN VITICULTURE, 1700s-1880s 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the growth of viticulture in Cataluna 
took place near the coast in regions of low population density, and on marginal 
land. To attract tenants to undertake the arduous task of clearing the land, 
the planting of the vines, and then waiting the four years or so before a res-
pectable crop was forthcoming, landowners used a sharecropping contract, 
the rabassa morta. In exchange for access to the land, the rabasser, undertook 
to plant vines within a fixed period (usually between two and ten years), 
cultivate them in accordance with the customs of the region (us i costum de 
bon pages), and to hand over a previously agreed share of the harvest to the 
owner. The duration of the contract was originally until two thirds of the 
vines had died, hence the Catalan name rabassa morta —dead vine. Because 
of the length of the contracts, which inevitably involved two or more gene-
rations, continuity was guaranteed by the fact that property passed to a single 
heir (Santamaria 1878:xi and Institute de Reformas Sociales 1923: 67). A 
further incentive for the rabassers to cultivate carefully was that they were 
the legal owners of the vines. 
We have argued that indefinite contracts were chosen because they 
provided incentives to the sharecroppers to maximize output over the life 
of the vineyard, and protected the share that landlords received. For the share-
cropper, the initial investment was heavy, but consisted entirely of labor 
provided by the family. The sharecropper's limited savings, and difficulties 
in obtaining commercial loans, were partly offset by the possibility to cultivate 
subsistence crops until the vines came into production. Finally, and what 
seems crucial for the success of the rabassa morta, there was considerable 
flexibility in determining the share of the annual harvest that was payable 
as rent. As inputs were limited almost totally to land and labor in the pre-
phylloxera period, the size of the annual payment depended on the estimated 
labor requirements and potential fertility of the soil. Because of the heavy 
use of labor in planting, and the modest yields of traditional agriculture in 
Cataluna, the initial contracts frequently required the rabasser to hand over 
only a small share of the harvest, with a fifth or a third not being unusual 
(Roig i Armengol 1890: 176). This allowed the sharecropper to receive a 
significant share of the marginal product of his labor. 
Another important factor for the success of sharecropping contracts was that 
there were few economies of scale in traditional viticulture. In Cataluna, 
ploughs were rarely used before the late 19th century (making the need to 
own work animals unnecessary), few hand tools were required (pruning knives, 
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hoes) and, until the appearance of new diseases from the 1850s, no chemicals. 
Likewise, the scale of production in wine making was also small, and capital 
requirements consequently limited, allowing most rabassers to make their 
own wine. 
One problem facing landowners in this period was the interpretation of 
the length of the contract. As we have seen, the traditional rabassa morta 
contracts were supposed to remain in operation until two thirds of the vines 
had died. However, unless hit by disease, vines were unlikely to die altogether, 
and it was in neither parties interest to see harvests declining slowly because 
dead, or dying, plants were not being replaced. Furthermore, the clause that 
the rabasser should follow the good farming practices of the region, was widely 
interpreted to imply that they should replant dead or dying vines by trailing 
shoots from a neighbouring plant. Therefore, until the disease phylloxera 
made its appearance in the region in the 1880s, the vineyard's life was often 
considered indefinite. 
The length of the contracts created a potential problem for both parties 
because whereas the share of the harvest remained fixed at the level which had 
been initially negotiated, commodity and factor prices inevitably changed 
significantly over time. Furthermore, local and central governments' tax 
polices were also likely to change, presenting new obligations which had to 
be divided between the two parties. These potential problems appear more 
significant for the landowner because, whereas the sharecropper had the right 
to sell the vines, the landowner could only recover full possession of the land 
only if the sharecropper failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in 
the contract, and then only after costly legal action (Santamaria 1878:123). 
The increase in wine prices during the last third of the 18th century made 
landowners take more serious the question of the vineyard's natural life and, 
as early as 1765, attempts were made to make the practice of replanting dead 
vines illegal (Balcells 1980: 42). However, it was not in the landowners' 
interest to receive back a dying vineyard and consequently their angle of 
attack changed. In 1778 the Real Audience of Cataluna declared that replanting 
could take place, but the life of the vineyard was to be taken as 50 years. 
However this ruling does not seem to have had much immediate effect. 
A notary in the Penedes district still drew up some 90% of the new contracts 
by the natural life of the vines in the 1820s, although by the 1850s the figure 
had fallen to 55%, and by the 1880s there were none (Giralt 1965). The expla-
nation of this delay can be traced to movements in commodity prices, with 
the weakness in wine and spirit prices from the second decade of the 19th 
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century only ending in the late 1840s on account of oidium attacking Europe's 
vines. Yet before these changes could take affect, most of the region's vines 
had been destroyed by disease. 
SHARECROPPING AND THE LOSS OF COMPETITIVENESS OF 
CATALAN VITICULTURE 1890S-1930S 
The period from the early 1870s to the mid 1880s was oneof great prosperity 
in Cataluiia. Wine prices doubled, as France was forced to import heavily 
to make up the shortfall in its domestic production because of phylloxera, 
a disease which would in time destroy virtually all of Europe's vines. Just 
as French production was beginning to recover, the disease hit Spain. Catalan 
landowners had now to overcome three problems, namely the replanting of 
the dead or dying vines, the need to adapt to lower wine prices (brought about 
by both the recovery in French production, and the growth in output in new 
countries, especially Algeria), and lastly, peculiar to our region, the need 
for landowners to decide whether to renegotiate contracts with their share-
croppers as phylloxera, which had destroyed the vines, brought to an end 
the old ones. In general, in the traditional areas of the rabassa morta, virtually 
all vineyards were replanted using sharecropping contracts, although these 
were now almost all limited in time, even if they continued to be long term. 
Yet despite the continued use of sharecropping contracts, prosperity in Catalan 
viticulture was limited in the half century or so before Spain's Civil War. 
If sharecropping appears to have been an integral part of the regional success 
prior to phylloxera, to what extent was it now a cause of the difficulties? 
One possibility that needs a brief consideration is that land owners and 
sharecroppers signed the new contracts, not because sharecropping was 
considered as the most efficient form to work the land, but rather as a com-
promise, because neither party could get rid of the other. In this case, it would 
be argued that the landowners would have preferred to work the land directly 
themselves, using wage labor, but the costs of evicting the sharecroppers 
was thought excessive; for the sharecropper, their belief that the land was 
morally, if not legally their own would have been (and indeed was) challenged 
by the landlords in the courts. A compromise therefore suggests a path 
dependent argument, in which an inefficient institution was chosen, because 
an alternative would have involved excessive transaction costs. However, 
even if this is true, it does not explain why the rabassa morta should suddenly 
become inefficient after several centuries of apparently working well. 
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Furthermore, the evidence does not suggest that landlords seriously contem-
plated alternatives, or that sharecroppers were not happy with renewing new 
contracts, at least in the initial years after phylloxera. 
A second, and more likely argument, is that the contracts were less suited 
to market conditions in the period 1900-1936, than they had previously been. 
We shall consider two areas where this is appears to have been so, namely 
the changes in the wine:labor price, and the division of the harvest between 
the two parties (Carmona and Simpson 1997a). 
Traditional viticulture used, as we have seen, primarily inputs of land and 
labor. With sharecropping, the cropper provided the labor and the landlord the 
land, with the harvest divided between the two on the basis of a valuation of 
their respective contributions. We have argued that, despite the indefinite 
nature of the original rabassa morta contracts, changes in the relative prices of 
land and labor over time, probably did not cause serious distortions in the 
distribution of profits between the two parties. With the new contracts, this was 
not the case, as land prices probably declined from the late 19th century, whilst 
wages rose strongly (Saguer 1996; Garrabou etal. 1991). Furthermore, as 
shown in the Figure 1, wine prices moved in the opposite direction to wages. 
Given the close proximity of Barcelona, a rapidly growing and prosperous 
industrial city, which saw its population jump from around 270 thousand 
in 1887 to a million in 1930, it is not surprising that sharecroppers felt that 
their living standards were slipping compared to other groups of workers. 
Yet there was another, perhaps more important factor, which would now 
erode the efficiency of the sharecropping contracts. The combination of disease 
and the more delicate post-phylloxera vines demanded a considerable increase 
in off-farm expenditure, and changed the nature of viticulture in regions such 
as Cataluna. First wine diseases required the use of chemicals —sulphur for 
oidium and copper salts or Bordeaux mixture for mildew. Second, phylloxera 
led to the use of specialized, rented machinery for removing the dead vines, 
and ploughs which were drawn by winches and worked at the depth about 
half a metre to prepare the land for replanting (Aguilo y Cortes 1897: 152). 
Somebody also had to purchase the american root stock, and the new vines 
were more susceptible to disease (implying a greater need for chemicals), 
and required fertilizers. If crop yields were higher, this was offset by the fact 
that the vine's life was now much shorter, about 20-5 years, instead of 50 
or 60 years (Balcells 1980:69). Finally, the rising cost of labor and declining 
real wine prices from the late 19th century was leading to greater competition 
between producers everywhere. As a response, growers in France's Midi or 
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Algeria, were improving yields, and achieving economies of scale through 
heavy capital investment. For example, in the Midi, there was an increase 
in the size of vineyards, with those of more than 40 hectares (producing over 
2,000 hectolitres of wine) accounting for 48% of the harvest by 1897-1902 
(Pech 1975: 142 and 149). Although the area under vines in this region was 
similar in the late 1920s as it had been in the early 1870s, yields increased 
by two thirds (Pech 1975: 496-8). 
The increase in capital requirements in viticulture, caused by both the 
more demanding nature of the new vines and the attempts by growers to 
increase yields, highlighted a serious shortcoming of the rabassa morta 
contract. In theory, these new inputs might have been provided jointly by 
both parties, but in practice most sharecroppers lacked capital. Instead, it 
was frequently provided by landowners, but at the cost of raising their share 
of the harvest. Therefore in a period of rising wages, sharecroppers were 
required to work the land for a smaller share of total output. Furthermore, 
yields were at least a third less than in the Midi, although labor inputs appear 
roughly similar, due to the fact that sharecropping remained small scale, and 
capital investment relatively low (Carmona and Simpson 1997a). 
The declining share of the harvest that the sharecropper received, caused 
by the changing nature of viticulture after phylloxera, reduced their incentives 
to work more efficiently the land. However there was another factor which 
links directly the question of institutional failure and the loss of competiti-
veness, and that was the breakdown of trust between the landowner and the 
cropper (Carmona and Simpson 1997b). This was caused by widespread 
changes in Catalan society, and turned what essentially was an economic 
problem of distribution, into a political one of landownership. In complete 
contrast with France's Midi, where the problems of low wine prices helped 
cement the interests of the propietaires (large estate owners) and cultivateurs 
(small growers who often worked part of the year for the propietaires) in 
1907 in a pressure group for the sector, Confederation gererale des vignerons 
du Midi (Smith, 1978), in Cataluna they divided landowners and rabassers 
into two conflicting political groups. Whereas the legal grounds for most 
sharecroppers to full ownership of their property was small, the growing 
conflicts with Catalan society encouraged the rabassers to look for a 
distributional solution —namely the full ownership of the land, rather than 
a sectorial one— incentives to limit wine fraud, reduced taxation, etc., as 
was the case in France. This polarization of Catalan society inevitably has 
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important consequences for the efficiency of sharecropping and greatly 
encouraged opportunistic behavior on the part of the cropper. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have argued that the long term success of the rabassa morta 
contract was that it balanced the need to provide incentives to the sharecropper, 
while at the same time protected the landowner's share of the harvest. These 
conditions were met, in general from the late 17th to the late 19th centuries. 
With the development of a more capital intensive viticulture, which 
increasingly provided opportunities to achieve economies of scale, and the 
more demanding nature of the new vines after phylloxera, these favourable 
conditions began to be eroded. First, the share of the harvest that growers 
received declined, and therefore their incentives to cultive carefully the vine. 
At the same time, wine prices in real times decline, and real wages soared, 
which increased the opportunity cost of sharecroppers labor. Finally, wider 
changes in Spanish, and in particular, Catalan society, led to a radicalization 
of politics, and the claim by the rabassers for full ownership of the land. 
With such a climate the important element of trust disappeared, increasing 
problems of monitoring and moral hazard for the owner. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1. Movements in wine prices and wages. Barcelona, 1865-1930. 
1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 
- day wages 
- wine prices 
Nominal wine prices and wages are used. 
Sources: Balcells (1980: 375-9) for wine prices in Cataluna; Garrabou et al. (1991: 40-2) 
for male agricultural wages. 
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